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Conservation of Threat

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Here's some interesting research about how we perceive threats. Basically, as the environment becomes safer we basically manufacture new threats. From an essay about the research:

To study how concepts change when they become less common, we brought volunteers into our laboratory and gave them a simple task ­-- to look at a series of computer-generated faces and decide which ones seem "threatening." The faces had been carefully designed by researchers to range from very intimidating to very harmless.

As we showed people fewer and fewer threatening faces over time, we found that they expanded their definition of "threatening" to include a wider range of faces. In other words, when they ran out of threatening faces to find, they started calling faces threatening that they used to call harmless. Rather than being a consistent category, what people considered "threats" depended on how many threats they had seen lately.

This has a lot of implications in security systems where humans have to make judgments about threat and risk: TSA agents, police noticing "suspicious" activities, "see something say something" campaigns, and so on.

The academic paper.

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Irenes
112 days ago
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jimwise
115 days ago
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...
kazriko
114 days ago
https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2018/06/sexism-racism-never-diminishes-even-everyone-becomes-less-sexist-racist.html Another link to the same subject.

elugraphy: ジャングルスライダーAbandoned pool with jungle water slides.

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elugraphy:

ジャングルスライダー

Abandoned pool with jungle water slides.

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Irenes
113 days ago
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Wow. Beautiful and strange.
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Rotenberg counters Secretary Ross' GDPR message

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In response to a recent opinion piece by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, who argued the GDPR is harmful to Americans, Electronic Privacy Information Center President Marc Rotenberg argues in the Financial Times that "many Americans welcome the new privacy law of the EU." In fact, he writes, the U.S. ought to follow the European Union's lead and install privacy laws of its own with similar teeth, as the "current self-regulatory regime has left companies, many of whom want to be good on privacy, unclear about what they should do." Nor, he argued, should Americans accept that reduced innovation would be the price paid for robust privacy law in the future. (Registration may be required to access this story.) 
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Irenes
142 days ago
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Doctors tried to lower $148K cancer drug cost; makers triple price of pill

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A drug that treats a variety of white blood cell cancers typically costs about $148,000 a year, and doctors can customize and quickly adjust doses by adjusting how many small-dose pills of it patients should take each day—generally up to four pills. At least, that was the case until now.

Last year, doctors presented results from a small pilot trial hinting that smaller doses could work just as well as the larger dose—dropping patients down from three pills a day to just one. Taking just one pill a day could dramatically reduce costs to around $50,000 a year. And it could lessen unpleasant side-effects, such as diarrhea, muscle and bone pain, and tiredness. But just as doctors were gearing up for more trials on the lower dosages, the makers of the drug revealed plans that torpedoed the doctors’ efforts: they were tripling the price of the drug and changing pill dosages.

The drug, ibrutinib (brand name Imbruvica), typically came in 140mg capsules, of which patients took doses from 140mg per day to 560mg per day depending on their cancer and individual medical situation. (There were also 70mg capsules for patients taking certain treatment combinations or having liver complications.) The pills treat a variety of cancers involving a type of white blood cell called B cells. The cancers include mantle cell lymphoma, which was approved for treatment with four 140mg pills per day, and chronic lymphocytic leukemia, approved to be treated with three 140mg pills per day. Each 140mg pill costs somewhere around $133—for now.

Imbruvica’s makers, Janssen and Pharmacyclics, have now gotten approval to sell four different tablets of varying strengths: 140mg, 280mg, 420mg, and 560mg. But the new pills will all be the same price—around $400 each—even the 140mg dose pill. The makers will stop selling the old, cheaper 140mg pill within three months, according to a report by the Washington Post.

The plan nixes any chance to lower costs with lower dosages. Even if patients can drop down to just 140mg a day, they’ll pay three times what they pay now for each 140mg pill.

In a statement to the Post, Janssen and Pharmacyclics explained the move by saying the new line-up is “a new innovation to provide patients with a convenient one pill, once-a-day dosing regimen and improved packaging, with the intent to improve adherence to this important therapy.” They noted that those taking 560mg a day will save money with the new pricing.

But doctors balked at what they saw as an underhanded move. In an interview with the Post, oncologist Mark Ratain of the University of Chicago Medicine put things bluntly: “That got us kind of pissed off.”

Ratain and colleagues wrote a commentary in the weekly newsletter Cancer Letters this month, decrying the price hike and new pill series, calling it “highly unusual.” In addition to thwarting efforts to help lower treatment costs, the doctors pointed out that the new dosage lineup will make it harder to nimbly adjust patients’ doses by simply advising them to take different numbers of pills each day. Switching a patient from a 280mg or 420mg per day dose down to 140mg will require paperwork, filling a new prescription, and having patients return unused pills—a process that can drag out for weeks. And increasing a patient’s dose would either be just as lengthy of a process or risk multiplying their treatment costs even further by doubling or tripling the pills each day.

In their commentary, titled in part “Sales Revenues at the Potential Expense of Patient Safety,” the doctors lay out examples of when quick dosage changes would be necessary. Those include when a patient needs to drop down while they’re on a short course of antibiotics or to adjust for new combination-cancer treatments. “Any putative convenience advantage of taking one pill a day is negated by the marked inconvenience to the patient of having to return pills every time there is a need for a dosage change,” they write.

Ratain and colleagues end with a call to the Food and Drug Administration to look into the matter, “given that it creates a barrier to optimal prescribing for some patients,” they write. “We further urge the FDA to recognize that the combination of the high price per pill and the flat pricing scheme are specific impediments to safe administration, and that ignoring the marketing approach for ibrutinib is antithetical to fostering optimally safe dosing and administration.”

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Irenes
181 days ago
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Technicalleigh
184 days ago
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SF Bay area, CA (formerly ATL)
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cak0705
172 days ago
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Seems like and example of increasing costs to justify increasing costs. #followthemoney
jhamill
185 days ago
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This coming after the Goldman Sachs guy asking if curing disease was a viable business model it is clear the Free Market and Capitalism does NOT value people's lives. I get that you're in business to make a profit. But, you're in HEALTHCARE to care for people and sometimes that means you have to take a loss to HELP people.

My gut reaction to this would be a bill that would criminally punish CEOs and companies that raise drug prices.
California
quad
183 days ago
When are the "sometimes" firms should take losses? How does this reasoning not apply to every drug?
dnorman
186 days ago
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as someone who may be looking at needing ibrutinib, fuck every single thing about this. recover your R&D costs, sure, but don't price the damned drug out of reach of patients.
Calgary
satadru
186 days ago
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And thus endeth any future research into probing the lower end of the therapeutic range of drugs still under patent protection. There's just no longer any incentive to improve patient outcomes by reducing price any more.
New York, NY

Securing Elections

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Elections serve two purposes. The first, and obvious, purpose is to accurately choose the winner. But the second is equally important: to convince the loser. To the extent that an election system is not transparently and auditably accurate, it fails in that second purpose. Our election systems are failing, and we need to fix them.

Today, we conduct our elections on computers. Our registration lists are in computer databases. We vote on computerized voting machines. And our tabulation and reporting is done on computers. We do this for a lot of good reasons, but a side effect is that elections now have all the insecurities inherent in computers. The only way to reliably protect elections from both malice and accident is to use something that is not hackable or unreliable at scale; the best way to do that is to back up as much of the system as possible with paper.

Recently, there have been two graphic demonstrations of how bad our computerized voting system is. In 2007, the states of California and Ohio conducted audits of their electronic voting machines. Expert review teams found exploitable vulnerabilities in almost every component they examined. The researchers were able to undetectably alter vote tallies, erase audit logs, and load malware on to the systems. Some of their attacks could be implemented by a single individual with no greater access than a normal poll worker; others could be done remotely.

Last year, the Defcon hackers' conference sponsored a Voting Village. Organizers collected 25 pieces of voting equipment, including voting machines and electronic poll books. By the end of the weekend, conference attendees had found ways to compromise every piece of test equipment: to load malicious software, compromise vote tallies and audit logs, or cause equipment to fail.

It's important to understand that these were not well-funded nation-state attackers. These were not even academics who had been studying the problem for weeks. These were bored hackers, with no experience with voting machines, playing around between parties one weekend.

It shouldn't be any surprise that voting equipment, including voting machines, voter registration databases, and vote tabulation systems, are that hackable. They're computers -- often ancient computers running operating systems no longer supported by the manufacturers -- and they don't have any magical security technology that the rest of the industry isn't privy to. If anything, they're less secure than the computers we generally use, because their manufacturers hide any flaws behind the proprietary nature of their equipment.

We're not just worried about altering the vote. Sometimes causing widespread failures, or even just sowing mistrust in the system, is enough. And an election whose results are not trusted or believed is a failed election.

Voting systems have another requirement that makes security even harder to achieve: the requirement for a secret ballot. Because we have to securely separate the election-roll system that determines who can vote from the system that collects and tabulates the votes, we can't use the security systems available to banking and other high-value applications.

We can securely bank online, but can't securely vote online. If we could do away with anonymity -- if everyone could check that their vote was counted correctly -- then it would be easy to secure the vote. But that would lead to other problems. Before the US had the secret ballot, voter coercion and vote-buying were widespread.

We can't, so we need to accept that our voting systems are insecure. We need an election system that is resilient to the threats. And for many parts of the system, that means paper.

Let's start with the voter rolls. We know they've already been targeted. In 2016, someone changed the party affiliation of hundreds of voters before the Republican primary. That's just one possibility. A well-executed attack that deletes, for example, one in five voters at random -- or changes their addresses -- would cause chaos on election day.

Yes, we need to shore up the security of these systems. We need better computer, network, and database security for the various state voter organizations. We also need to better secure the voter registration websites, with better design and better internet security. We need better security for the companies that build and sell all this equipment.

Multiple, unchangeable backups are essential. A record of every addition, deletion, and change needs to be stored on a separate system, on write-only media like a DVD. Copies of that DVD, or -- even better -- a paper printout of the voter rolls, should be available at every polling place on election day. We need to be ready for anything.

Next, the voting machines themselves. Security researchers agree that the gold standard is a voter-verified paper ballot. The easiest (and cheapest) way to achieve this is through optical-scan voting. Voters mark paper ballots by hand; they are fed into a machine and counted automatically. That paper ballot is saved, and serves as a final true record in a recount in case of problems. Touch-screen machines that print a paper ballot to drop in a ballot box can also work for voters with disabilities, as long as the ballot can be easily read and verified by the voter.

Finally, the tabulation and reporting systems. Here again we need more security in the process, but we must always use those paper ballots as checks on the computers. A manual, post-election, risk-limiting audit varies the number of ballots examined according to the margin of victory. Conducting this audit after every election, before the results are certified, gives us confidence that the election outcome is correct, even if the voting machines and tabulation computers have been tampered with. Additionally, we need better coordination and communications when incidents occur.

It's vital to agree on these procedures and policies before an election. Before the fact, when anyone can win and no one knows whose votes might be changed, it's easy to agree on strong security. But after the vote, someone is the presumptive winner -- and then everything changes. Half of the country wants the result to stand, and half wants it reversed. At that point, it's too late to agree on anything.

The politicians running in the election shouldn't have to argue their challenges in court. Getting elections right is in the interest of all citizens. Many countries have independent election commissions that are charged with conducting elections and ensuring their security. We don't do that in the US.

Instead, we have representatives from each of our two parties in the room, keeping an eye on each other. That provided acceptable security against 20th-century threats, but is totally inadequate to secure our elections in the 21st century. And the belief that the diversity of voting systems in the US provides a measure of security is a dangerous myth, because few districts can be decisive and there are so few voting-machine vendors.

We can do better. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security declared elections to be critical infrastructure, allowing the department to focus on securing them. On 23 March, Congress allocated $380m to states to upgrade election security.

These are good starts, but don't go nearly far enough. The constitution delegates elections to the states but allows Congress to "make or alter such Regulations". In 1845, Congress set a nationwide election day. Today, we need it to set uniform and strict election standards.

This essay originally appeared in the Guardian.

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Irenes
184 days ago
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Pioneering Psychologist Hans Asperger Was a Nazi Sympathizer Who Sent Children to Be Killed, New Evidence Suggests

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The term “Asperger’s syndrome” will never be heard the same way again, owing to new research showing that Hans Asperger—the Austrian pediatrician for whom the disorder was named—was an active participant in the Nazi eugenics program, recommending that patients deemed “not fit for life” be sent to a notorious…

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Technicalleigh
186 days ago
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Fuck him. And because it can't be said often or strongly enough, fuck Nazis.
SF Bay area, CA (formerly ATL)
Irenes
185 days ago
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